Poland is often regarded as being a country that is almost entirely dominated by the right, with the left only noted for its absence. From the early 1990s Poland was presented as the success story of the neo-liberal transition to capitalism; and for nearly a decade and a half its political scene has been dominated by two parties from the right: the Law and Justice Party (PiS) and Citizens’ Platform (PO). Under the overbearing influence of the Catholic Church, Polish society is viewed as holding conservative and regressive opinions. The conservative authoritarian programme of PiS, enacted since 2015, has entrenched this image, with Poland joining the leading pack of right-wing ‘populist’ governments around the world. Yet, the Polish left has a rich history, and at times offered hope and inspiration for the wider international left. Even after the fall of ‘Communism’ the left became the most stable political force in Polish politics for well over a decade.  The Polish left’s subsequent demise should provide a warning to the rest of the left in Europe and beyond, and the lessons of its virtual collapse will need to be learnt if it is to return as a significant political force.

The present fate of the Polish left is tied up with its complicated and sometimes tragic history. For the purposes of this article, we start from the late ‘Communist’ period. By the mid-1970s the unprecedented period of economic and social advancement, following the Second World War, had started to come to an end. By the beginning of the 1980s, social frustrations with life under ‘really existing socialism’ had facilitated the emergence of a mass opposition movement, uniting sections of the intelligentsia and industrial working class. Solidarność (Solidarity) combined immediate demands for raising living standards with calls for a renewal of socialism and the self-management of workplaces. This mass movement was repressed by the state, with Martial Law introduced in December 1981. In these conditions, the government, under the auspices of the western financial institutions to which Poland had become indebted, introduced a series of economic reforms that eroded the socialised basis of the economy and further reduced the living standards of the population. 

The ‘Communist’ system was formally ended in 1989, following a series of negotiations held between the government and opposition. Contradicting the agreements made during these negotiations, the new government introduced a radical package of neo-liberal economic reforms. Within two years GDP had contracted by around a quarter and unemployment, social inequalities and poverty soared. This eroded support for the liberal political forces, that had emerged out of the Solidarność movement, and opened up new opportunities for the left. 

At the end of ‘Communism’ some had hoped that a new left would coalesce around forces derived from Solidarność. However, the vast majority of the former left intelligentsia supported the neo-liberal reforms, and the organisations and political strength of the working class, which had already been weakened by Martial Law, were decimated. Presently only around 8 percent of Polish workers belong to a trade union. Therefore, the strongest party of the left came not out of the former opposition, but from the reformed ex-ruling party during ‘Communism’. This was not only because this grouping had more financial means or competent leaders than the post-Solidarność left, although this was certainly a factor. It was also because this political current was associated most directly with the previous system, which, for all its disorders and repressions, was still regarded by many as having provided a large degree of social security and stability. They also stood against the most extreme policies of the right, such as abolishing the right to abortion, introducing a programme of de-communisation and handing large economic and political power over to the Catholic Church.

At the 1993 parliamentary elections, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) – built indirectly out of the remnants of the former Polish United Workers’ Party –  emerged as the largest electoral bloc, subsequently forming a coalition government with the agrarian Polish People’s Party (PSL). Also in 1995, the SLD’s candidate, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, won the Presidential elections, thus handing almost total political power over to those who had been a part of the ruling party during ‘Communism’. The SLD-led government essentially maintained the strategic course of the transition, continuing to privatise sections of the economy, taking Poland into NATO and moving the country towards membership of  the European Union. However, significantly, it slowed the tempo of the economic reforms and strengthened elements of the state economy that had been severely weakened over the previous few years. This helped to instigate an economic recovery, with GDP growth rising to 7 percent and unemployment falling by a half. Although the SLD lost the 1997 parliamentary elections to a reunited right-wing bloc, it actually increased its share of the vote and cemented its position as the country’s major left-wing force. 

The SLD (now consolidated as a single political party) returned to power in 2001, winning more than 40 percent of the vote. The SLD victory came after a disastrous right-wing government had sped up the pace of neo-liberal economic reform, leaving the economy stagnating and unemployment approaching 20 percent. With Kwaśniewski retaining his position as President, the left had an ideal opportunity to shape the future direction of Poland. 

The second SLD government was, however, very different to the first. The extreme neo-liberal policies of the previous government had decimated large sections of the state economy and public sector, meaning that simply slowing down the pace of reform was now not enough to protect living standards. Also, Poland was finalising its negotiations over joining the EU, with Brussels insisting that the Polish government complete a series of liberal economic reforms. The Polish government was reliant upon the support of the Catholic Church and the then Polish Pope in the EU referendum, who in return insisted that the government did not fulfil such manifesto promises as liberalising the country’s draconian abortion law. Finally, the SLD ideologically aligned itself with the rightward shift in European social democracy, led by Tony Blair and Gerard Schroeder, following the former into Bush’s military adventure in Iraq. 

These combined decisions and policies of the second SLD government (along with a series of corruption scandals) resulted in an historic defeat for the left, from which it has yet to recover. The SLD vote declined to just 11 percent in 2005 and it has since (under different organisational guises) failed to gain more than 13 percent in any parliamentary election, nor offer a credible candidate at a presidential election. At the 2015 parliamentary elections the SLD electoral bloc gained less than 8 percent of the vote and for the first time in history the left has no representatives in the Polish parliament. 

In these conditions it was anticipated  by some that a new left-wing party, devoid of the SLD’s historical baggage, may grow in Poland. At the 2015 elections a new young left-wing party Razem (Together) won 3 percent of the vote, thus receiving government subsidies that provided the means to build an alternative structure to the SLD. Razem defined itself politically in opposition to the SLD, in a period when  PiS were shifting the country further to the right and the opposition to this was being led by the liberal centre. This strategy was not understood by the vast majority of the left electorate and Razem failed to build on its previous relative successes at the local and European elections. Similarly, an attempt this year to build a new liberal-left party Wiosna (Spring), as the main opposition to the right in Poland, failed almost before it began. With other sections of the left being swallowed up by the centre-right Citizens’ Platform (PO), the SLD has once again remained the largest and most robust political party of a weak left. 

The major challenge facing the Polish left, over the past couple of years, has been how to present a viable opposition to an increasingly conservative and authoritarian right-wing government, which has simultaneously introduced some new elements of social spending. PiS has managed to replace the left as the party most identified with defending social welfare and living standards, although its programme has a distinct conservative character and does not address many of the most urgent problems facing the Polish economy and society (e.g. energy transition, health care and pensions). The opposition to this government has come mainly from PO and other sections of the liberal centre, thus creating a right-wing matrix within which the left has no place.

A significant step has been taken in the run up to October’s parliamentary elections, with Razem and Wiosna agreeing to stand as part of an SLD led coalition: Lewica (Left). This coalition is offering a classical social democratic programme of increasing public and social spending, whilst pushing for a green transition in energy. Although the left has no chance of competing for power in these elections, there is a strong possibility that it will return to parliament. This would represent a small but important step in rebuilding the left in the country. If successful it will also show that cooperation amongst different sections of the left, whatever their historical background, is essential if it is to challenge the dominant right-wing hegemony and that the left must present a clear left-wing alternative to the electorate. 

Failure to overcome its historical divisions and the advocacy of a Blairite neo-liberal version of social democracy, led to the virtual collapse of the Polish left. The conservative and nationalist right has subsequently filled the void it left. Such a situation is not unique to Poland. Hungary underwent an almost identical process, with the collapse in support for the Hungarian Socialist Party a decade ago, resulting in Viktor Orban and his party becoming the dominant force in Hungarian politics. In the wake of the economic crisis in Europe, and the imposition of austerity in many European countries, some of western Europe’s strongest centre-left parties (e.g. in France, Holland and Italy) have suffered resounding defeats. When the left departs the political scene as a serious political player, so the conservative and extreme right are able to monopolise politics and set a country’s political agenda. Poland is not exceptionally right-wing, either historically or culturally. Rather its left was defeated earlier and more resoundingly than in most other European countries.